“Synaptic Self. How our brains become who we are”

Who are you, and how would you define your ‘self’? How do you know yourself? And how can brain science shed light upon this experience of being you, a ‘me’, a stable unity through changes over time? Is it possible that your feeling of self is grounded in unconscious cognitive or neurobiological processes? Philosophical debates have long argued for different aspects of self-awareness. The philosopher David Hume failed to find the self through introspection, and maintained that the self is an illusion. Contrary to this, recent accounts, such as Galen Strawson, argue that the self indeed is a true entity of the mind, not a fiction.

Science is now beginning to view mental processes, such as self-awareness, as legitimate issues. During the last decade, the scientific study of the mind has grown immensely.

Joseph LeDoux’s recent book – “Synaptic self. How our brains become who we are” – is one attempt to discuss the ‘self’ from the cognitive neuroscience of emotions. LeDoux is the author of the best-selling book “Emotional Brain”, where he presented a popular account of the biological bases of our emotions and memories. Now, LeDoux attempts to challenge the common view that regards the self – a person’s feeling of ‘self-ness’ – as solely a mental phenomenon, and emphasises the importance of both conscious and unconscious processes in its construction. From the outset LeDoux’ primary focus is on the unconscious cognitive and neural processes that are fundamental for the sense of self.

The book’s main thesis sounds like this: it is the neural pathways and synaptic relationships in our brains that make us who we are. LeDoux goes to a great extent to explain the basics of the brain’s cell structure, neural communication, and synaptic plasticity. Starting with a description of basic neural anatomy, he reviews experiments and research, arguing that the brain’s synaptic connections provide the biological base for memory, which in turn makes possible the sense of continuity and permanence fundamental to a ‘normal’ conception of self.

At this level, the book is both entertaining and informative. LeDoux has a way of writing simple and clearly to the benefit of the general reader, but still includes important notes for scientific readers. Thus, as an introduction to the neural basis of emotion, fear and anxiety, ‘Synaptic Self’ is well worth reading.

However, the book falls short of its stated goal. The concepts ‘self’ and ‘personality’ are never properly defined. To sidestep the age-old questions about self-awareness, LeDoux has chosen to use a “process approach.” One reason for this is the claim that introspection is an unreliable method, referring to the 19th century students of consciousness, who were said to use introspection. Historians today, however, find that 19th century psychologists like James and Wundt actually used very little systematic introspection. Furthermore, they never called themselves ‘introspectionists’, and rarely, if ever, used introspection. The word ‘introspectionism’ was a post-hoc label used by behaviouristic historians to describe what people like James and Wundt explicitly denied they were doing. Wundt never used systematic introspection, except in a very short introductory book that was translated into English; he denied its usefulness, particularly for higher functions, and his laboratory notebooks show few if any introspective experiments. Wundt thought introspective accounts were unreliable. Systematic introspection was Titchener’s idea, but today, he is considered a minor figure with little lasting influence. As a result, LeDoux’ claimed solution to the introspectionists’ fallacy is based upon a profound misunderstanding of the history of psychology.

Furthermore, LeDoux confuses existing definitions, using the terms ‘self’ and ‘personality’ for the same phenomenon. Contrary to this, in the scientific literature, these terms are quite distinct and are used for different aspects of a human being. The term ‘personality’ usually refer to a complex of all the externally observable attributes that characterise a unique individual. In contrast, ‘self’ is usually used to refer to consciousness about one’s own identity or ‘self-ness’. This means that self usually denotes a mental phenomenon, something that is only internally observable. From this view, even the title ‘Synaptic Self’ seems misleading.

LeDoux’ process approach take on the ‘self’ also seems incomplete. When LeDoux claims that “the self consists of more than what self aware organisms are consciously aware of”, this leads to two additional questions: first, one has to define and explain the difference between the conscious and unconscious self; second, it is necessary to explain how the two ‘selves’ relate to each other. LeDoux does neither. This is expressed through his exclusive reference to behavioural research and almost none to cases where people describe their own emotions.

Thus, LeDoux only succeeds in restating the problem of the relationship between the experienced self and the unconscious, neurocognitive processes that constitute this mental phenomenon. Having a considerable amount of knowledge about synaptic processes in memory undoubtedly is of great value when we want to understand and explain mental processes such as the self. But when this knowledge is used only in implicit comparison to something that at best can be called a naïve and ‘folk’ concept of ‘self’, nothing is gained. This is unfortunately still a predominant tendency in scientific studies of mental phenomena today; there is a highly developed knowledge, methodology and vocabulary in the study of cognitive and neurobiological factors, and a poorly developed use of phenomenological issues.

Finally, LeDoux fails to distinguish between what can be called self-systems and nonself regions of the brain. That is, which regions of the brain are active when a subject is self-aware? The claim that memory processes and emotion is important for the experienced self is much too unspecific, close to being a tautology. Unfortunately, this seems to be a fairly typical trend among scientists who know how to do experiments, but have a bad taste in conceptual thinking. The result of that is to undermine the proper uses of terms like “self.” It is actively pernicious.

In sum, Joseph LeDoux’ ‘Synaptic Self’ can be read in two ways: writing for a general audience, he succeeds in making his subject accessible to the dedicated non-specialist. He offers absorbing descriptions of fascinating case studies in his field, he provides insight into the shortcomings of psychopharmacology and suggests new directions for research on the biology of mental illness. On the other hand, reading the book as a review of scientific studies and theories about the self – even the unconscious processes that constitute the premises for this self – one will be greatly misled. LeDoux simply fails to see that his treatment of the subject leads to an explanatory gap between the experience and the underlying processes.

© 2003 TZ Ramoy

References

1. Hume, David – “A Treatise on Human Nature”. Oxford University Press
2. LeDoux, Joseph (1998) – “Emotional brain: the mysterious underpinnings of emotional life” Touchstone Books
3. Strawson, Galen (2000) – “The self”. In: Gallagher & Shear “Models of the Self” Imprint Academic