Cephalopod consciousness: Behavioural evidence
Building on past investigations of the possibility of a form of consciousness in birds and cephalopod molluscs, Jennifer Mather reports on cephalopod consciousness in an article in Consciousness and Cognition. Using global workspace as a criterion for consciousness, Mather concludes that cephalopods appear to have primary consciousness. Abstract: Behavioural evidence suggests that cephalopod molluscs may […]
Building on past investigations of the possibility of a form of consciousness in birds and cephalopod molluscs, Jennifer Mather reports on cephalopod consciousness in an article in Consciousness and Cognition. Using global workspace as a criterion for consciousness, Mather concludes that cephalopods appear to have primary consciousness.
Abstract:
Behavioural evidence suggests that cephalopod molluscs may have a form of primary consciousness. First, the linkage of brain to behaviour seen in lateralization, sleep and through a developmental context is similar to that of mammals and birds. Second, cephalopods, especially octopuses, are heavily dependent on learning in response to both visual and tactile cues, and may have domain generality and form simple concepts. Third, these animals are aware of their position, both within themselves and in larger space, including having a working memory of foraging areas in the recent past. Thus if using a ‘global workspace’ which evaluates memory input and focuses attention is the criterion, cephalopods appear to have primary consciousness.
